Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers
Volume 9

Issue 1

Article 11

1-1-1992

Philip Clayton, EXPLANATION FROM PHYSICS TO THEOLOGY: AN
ESSAY IN RATIONALITY AND RELIGION
Nancey Murphy

Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy

Recommended Citation
Murphy, Nancey (1992) "Philip Clayton, EXPLANATION FROM PHYSICS TO THEOLOGY: AN ESSAY IN
RATIONALITY AND RELIGION," Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol.
9 : Iss. 1 , Article 11.
DOI: 10.5840/faithphil19929113
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol9/iss1/11

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and
creative exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange.

Faith and Philosophy

124

to be at odds with God's will. Thomists have various strategies of response
to this question, of course. But a theologian who is not convinced of the
adequacy of these responses might be led to affirm that part of God's creative
purpose for us is to grant us a limited freedom in relation to God as well as
to one another. When talk of such freedom is motivated in this way, it is far
from clear that it reflects a "theologically inexplicable" (p. 145) departure
from the basic rules of Christian discourse.
Given the limits of space, I have not commented here on Tanner's use of
materials from the history of theology to illustrate her points. Her interweaving of themes from Aquinas and Barth is particularly noteworthy, and she
provides illuminating commentary on a number of past disputes (e.g., between Molina and Banez). One of the special contributions of this book is
that it provides an outstanding model for the use of historical materials in
exploring issues of contemporary importance in philosophical theology.

Explanation/rom Physics to Theology: An Essay ill Rationality and Religion,
by Philip Clayton. New Haven: Yale University, 1989. Pp. ix and 230.
$26.50. ISBN 0-300-0435308.
NANCEY MURPHY, Fuller Theological Seminary.
Philip Clayton's Explanation from Physics

to

Theology is an intriguing book.

It pursues a worthy goal in a highly competent manner. The goal is to counter

the tendency of modern liberal theology to take theological assertions as
anything but assertions (as expressions of religious feeling, or existential
orientation, or as moral recommendations) by showing theology to be enough
like science that whatever truth value science has must accrue to theology as
well. He begins with an account of the history of philosophy of the natural
sciences, since these are taken to be our best examples of rational explanation
and warranted assertability. He then turns to the social sciences, whose concern with questions of meaning has long been said to require an entirely
different methodology. However, he concludes that the differences have been
exaggerated-in both cases the essence of science is providing explanations.
These must fit the explanandum into an accepted framework, and must be
evaluated by means of a coherence criterion. This move puts him in a position
to tackle religion, whose cognitive component is understood as a system of
beliefs by means of which individuals and communities attempt to give meaning to the whole of experience. Theology, then, is a discipline that seeks to
discover and interpret systems of religious meaning and to assess the truth
of the religion's theory about ultimate reality according to the canons of
scientific explanation.
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The team to beat today in establishing the cognitive claims of theology is
the Yale school. Rightly or wrongly, the explication of theology provided by
George Lindbeck, Ronald Thiemann, et. alia} as intratextual has regularly
been read as the rejection of any attempt to establish the truth of Christian
belief in any stronger sense than that of internal coherence. Clayton's book
might be read as an argument to the effect that coherence, when construed
broadly enough to include correspondence with the facts, is just exactly what
scientific rationality (and truth) is all about. "Coherence," he says, "requires
the systematic interdependence or 'fit' of the various components of an explanatory account, both internally (call it the consistency criterion) and externally-with the situation (pragmatic criteria), with the data implied and
expressed by the explanandum (the correspondence criterion), and with the
broader context of experience (the comprehensiveness criterion). "2
This brings me to my criticism: is coherence in this sense all the scientist
has to go on in evaluating proposed explanations? If so, we can scarcely ask
more of theology. But has Clayton adequately summed up the best of current
philosophy of science? I think not. He rightly represents the work of Imre
Lakatos as the best theory to date of the rationality of science. Yet he overlooks what I take to be the most important of Lakatos's contributions: his
insistence on novel facts to confirm a research program.
Lakatos is interested in distinguishing between "progressive" and "degenerating" research programs. A research program is a temporal series of theoretical systems where a core theory and a plan for development (called the
positive heuristic) remain unchanged while lower-level "auxiliary" hypotheses are added or modified in order to account for a growing domain of data.
A degenerating research program is one in which the changes are all ad
hoc-they are merely verbal changes that make the theory consistent with already-known data. A progressive program, on the other hand, is one where
(occasionally, at least) the theoretical changes allow for the prediction and corroboration of facts that would have been entirely unexpected on the basis of
previous stages of the program. Such facts are Lakatos's prized "novel facts. "3
The value of novel facts appears when one realizes that creating consistency between theory and already-known facts is often more a test of the
scientist's ingenuity than of the theory. Furthermore, as Paul Feyerabend
points out, an older theory always has the advantage when coherence alone
is the test, since scientists have had more time in which to learn to describe
their observations in the terms of the older theory. The novel-facts criterion
comes as close as possible to Karl Popper's goal of allowing nature to speak
for itself in the evaluation of a theory.
Clayton's playing down of Lakatos's criterion of progress leads him to miss
a valuable opportunity to defend a holist account of theology similar to that
of his Yale mentors against the charge of cultural (epistemic, linguistic)
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relativism. And it needs to be so defended since the IU quoque argument
("science, too, is based merely on coherence") fails.4
Why has Clayton overlooked this opportunity? I speculate here. I suspect
that the cause is his definition of religions as systems of meaning. Earlier
theorists sought to locate religion in the sphere of meaning (or value, or
practical reasoning) precisely to insulate it from facts. Following in his modern predecessors' tracks, Clayton is bound to find the idea of a religious/act
suspect. Theological facts there may be-facts about first-order religious
language and practice, for example. But without religious facts, there is
nothing of an 'extratextual' nature against which to test the religion's theory
of ultimate reality. All facts, by definition, belong to some other discipline.
So at the core of Clayton's argument for the propositional (cognitive, scientific) treatment of theology lies a contradiction-the acceptance of the
modern social-scientific account of religion as a system of (non-propositional) meaning, which I suspect is the unrecognized cause of his failing to
make the strong case he could have made with the philosophy-of-science
resources at his disposal. s
Nonetheless, this is an important and interesting book. If Clayton has not
made the strongest case possible under the circumstances, he has still made
a great stride in the right direction. I recommend it for anyone interested in
the rationality of religion.
NOTES
1. See Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984); and
Thiemann's Revelation and Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press,
1985).
2. p. 48.
3. See Lakatos's "Falsification and the Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes," in The Methodology of Scielltific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers, Volume I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 8-101.

4. I have argued that theology, too, can be confirmed by means of novel facts. See my
Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning, (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University
Press, 1990), chs. 5 and 6.
5. I suggest that the very definition of religion that Clayton employs is incoherent.
Religion is defined as the ultimate (highest, broadest) context for the understanding of
experience (reality) as a whole. Yet the theorist is in making such a statement enunciating
a theory of theories, a broader social-scientific context that relativizes all religions as mere
instances. Social-scientific theories of religion, in the process of explaining religions as
ultimate contexts of meaning, necessarily make social sicence 'religion' (in that sense)
and reduce religions to something else.

